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ABSTRACT
Freedom of expression is a "cornerstone upon which the very existence
of a democratic society rests" [citation omitted]. Its importance takes on
a special meaning in the Western Hemisphere where numerous societies
are building and developing democracies while coping with the legacy
of authoritarianism, which exercised a profound institutional and cultural
influence in the region. This article critically examines the Inter-American
system of Human Rights, systematizing its jurisprudence while providing
an analytical framework designed to fully realize this essential human
right. Finally, this article proposes a series of measures to help achieve
that important objective.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression is a "cornerstone upon which the very existence
of a democratic society rests."' Its importance takes on a special meaning
in the Western Hemisphere, where numerous societies are building and
developing democracies while coping with the legacy of authoritarianism,
which had a deep institutional and cultural influence throughout the region.
The approach taken by authorities towards freedom of expression serves
as a social barometer of what direction change might take. Traditionally,
serious economic, political, social, and security problems have been used
to justify authoritarianism and validate the rejection of a pluralistic view of

1.

Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-05/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, 1 70 (13 Nov. 1985), available at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea-05-ing.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion
OC-05/85].
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society for which freedom of expression is essential. In contrast to strongmen who govern without checks and balances, or the case of political or
military vanguards who purport to "lead their nations or people," a human
rights framework offers an alternative which postulates that the rule of law,
including the right to free expression, represents both the values of human
dignity and a path of action to confront societal problems.
In the human rights approach, freedom of expression isa necessary check
to powerful executives and societal elites who monopolize information. It
allows the free and pluralistic flow and dissemination of information essential
to informed choices, facilitates individual participation in the democratic
process, and strengthens civil society. In the Western Hemisphere, the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948
and the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jos6, Costa
Rica) in 1969 created a regional normative framework in the human rights
arena, freely adopted by member states of the Organization of American
States (OAS). Despite the human rights obligations and norms set forth in
these documents, the region as a whole has yet to reach full compliance
with the protection of the right to freedom of expression, including the adoption of a normative framework that guarantees a pluralistic society so that
expression does not become an exclusive function of governmental power
or private monopolies. 2
Often, the right of freedom of expression iseither inadequately protected
under domestic law or the rules designed to protect it are disregarded. 3
Measures that seriously infringe upon the right to freedom of expression
include: prior censorship; contempt laws; 4 the seizing or barring of publications; excessive subsequent liability for libel and slander; absence of an
effective normative framework that concerns monopolies of information
and guarantees pluralism; and procedures that subject the free expression
or dissemination of information to government control.s
2.

American Convention on Human Rights, signed22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LV/
11.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1976) O.A.S.TS. No.36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force 18 July
1978), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic..documents.asp [hereinafter
American Convention); American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
Res. XXX, signed2 May 1948, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/Il.71 (1988) [hereinafter American

Declaration]; Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
2010, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/il, doc. 5, ch. 11(4 Mar. 2011), available
atwww.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/RELATORIA_2010_ENG.pdf [hereinafter 2010

3.

4.
5.

Report of the Special Rapporteurl.
Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2006, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.N./II.127, doc. 4, rev. 1, ch. I(3 Mar. 2007), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/Rapporteurship%20for/o2OFreedom%20
of/o20Expression.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur].
The phrase "contempt laws" is used to refer to what are known as leyes de desacato in
Spanish. Generally speaking, leyes de desacato punish "offensive" expressions directed
at public officials. Id. ch. II, 1 32.
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 1 54.
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Through the exercise of prior censorship, bureaucracies decide what
individuals can see, read, write, and produce by invoking such justifications as "national security," "public order," "protection of morals," "truth in
information," and "personal honor." However, because the possibilities for
abusing prior censorship are so great, enduring promotion of free debate is
preferable to risking censorship's "protective" suffocation of the free expression of ideas. 6
Contempt or desacato laws penalize "offensive" expression directed at
public officials or against private individuals concerning matters relevant to
the society at large. Contempt laws are currently included in the criminal
codes of the following seven Latin American countries: Bolivia, Brazil,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.! Although
punishing criticism was a logical corollary for authoritarian governments, it
is incompatible with the development of a full democracy. Allowing criticism free from fear of punishment-especially when directed at authority
or matters of public interest-reaffirms, inter alia, egalitarian principles
and ensures that public officials carry out their duties with transparency
and responsibility. 8 Conversely, the threat or imposition of penal sanctions
suffocates democracy and responds to an authoritarian logic incompatible
with the tenets of pluralistic society.
Subsequent and disproportionate liability in cases of libel and slander is
often imposed under the guise of "defense of honor."' Such abuse severely
curtails the right of free expression of ideas.10 Monopolization of information
by governments or private actors abusively defines and ignores the pluralism of democratic societies. However, the attacks against expression are
not limited to a deficient regulatory framework. Unfortunately, many crimes
committed against journalists, including assassination, go unpunished."
"Silencing" journalists threatens the population as a whole and is a stark
6.
7.

8.

available at http://www.cpj.org; WORLD PRESS
See generally Comm. TO PROTECTJOURNALISTS,
FREEDOMCOMM., available at http://www.wpfc.org/.
CODIGO PENAL,art. 162 (Bol.), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/bol/sp-bolint-text-cp.html; CODIGO PENAL,art. 331 (Braz.), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
mla/pt/bra/pt-bra-int-text-cp.pdf; CODIGO PENAL, arts. 144.1, 204 (Cuba), available at
http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/html/codigo penal.html; CoDfGO PENAL, arts. 128, 230-33
(Ecuador), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/ecu/sp-ecu-int-text-cp.pdf;
CODfCO PENAL, arts. 347-49 (Nicar.), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/mia/sp/
nic/sp-nic-int-text-cp.html; CODIGO PENAL,arts. 368-69 (Dom. Rep.), available at http://
www.suprema.gov.do/PDF_2/codigos/CodigoPenal.pdf; CODIGO PENAL,art. 223 (Venez.),
available at http://www.cicpc.govve/files/documentos/6-CODIGOPENAL.pdf.
Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression 1998, InterAm. Comm'n H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. doc. 6, ch. IV, § A, at 35-36 (16 Apr.
1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=1 34&IID=1
[hereinafter 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteud.

9.
10.
11.

Id. at 35-36.
Id.
Id. at 48.
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reminder that anyone, including the most visible, can be eliminated if they
dare to fully exercise their right to free expression. 12
Other de facto "measures" that seriously infringe upon freedom of
expression include economic measures that punish or reward the press for
its ideas, as well as tolerating public and private monopolies in information media.13 These grave normative and factual shortcomings in the legal
protection for freedom of expression still exist within many domestic legal
systems, reaffirming the need for international and, in this case, regional
protections of this fundamental freedom.
This article will analyze the rules and institutions that protect freedom
of expression in the Western Hemisphere, namely those contained in the
Inter-American system for the Protection of Human Rights (Inter-American
system). It will briefly describe the Inter-American system, its organs, and
the regulatory framework that applies to freedom of expression, while systematizing the relevant jurisprudence within that system. Finally, this article
will conclude by proposing a series of measures necessary to achieve full
enforcement of freedom of expression norms.
In the realm of free expression, crucial actors are not limited to members
of the OAS or its regional political organs. The analysis shows a complex
reality with initiatives adopted by domestic and transnational NGOs, the
press, the judiciary, members of parliament, and individuals who, resorting
to the regional system, use its procedures to demand implementation of
international norms. Expression, like all rights, is not given or granted, but
rather is the result of aspirations to a life worth living and hence a life worth
fighting for. The regional system, through its framework for protection and
possibilities for action has become a valuable tool at the international level
for channeling those aspirations, but more needs to be done to ensure full
protection of the right to freedom of expression.14

12.

22 Mar. 2000, available at
JOURNALISTS,
See Attacks on the Press in 1999, COMM. TO PROTECT
http://www.cpj.org/attacks99/frameset-att99/rightframeatt99.htmi (discussing results of
worldwide survey by the Committee to Protect Journalists). Since 2000, 511 journalists
have been killed worldwide. journalists Killed since 1992, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS,
6 Dec. 2010, available at http://cpj.org/killed/. For example, in 2006 alone, nineteen
journalists from member states were murdered. See generally, COMM. TO PROTECTJOURNALISTs,
available at http://cpj.org/killed/.

13.
14.

1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 26.
The contributions of the Inter-American system have proceeded through different phases.
The first phase was denouncing dictatorship, and mass and gross violations of human
rights such as disappearances, torture, and the absence of political rights.
The Inter-American system of protection of human rights itself then transitioned from
a denunciation of dictatorships to a rejection of its legacy, which included attempts to
cover the crimes of the past with a shroud of impunity. The defeat of dictatorship led
to a process of democratic transitions and resulted in elected governments in all of the
countries of the region, except Cuba.

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

366

Vol. 34

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

The international protection of human rights developed after World War II
in response to the tragic failure of an international system that was based on
the principle of absolute sovereignty, which excluded the acts of a government against its own citizens from the protections of human rights." The
grave consequences of this flawed approach (e.g., genocide, mass and gross
violations of human rights) led to the development of international rules and
institutions designed to identify and protect the rights of all individuals.16
A. Organs
The Inter-American system is a combination of human rights norms, institutions, and procedures created by the OAS member states, based upon
the American Declaration17 and the American Convention." The organs
responsible for supervising compliance with the established rules are the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights" ("the Commission") and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights20 ("the Court"). The task of guaran-

15.

Rejection of impunity meant that no one-not even those who had administered
fear and repression-could be above the law, and that everyone should answer for
their crimes. In the interest of populations that had been prevented from speaking and
receiving pluralistic information, the Inter-American system reinvigorated the value of
the right to freedom of expression (e.g., defining the content of the right and creating
the officer of the Special Rapporteur).
The third phase, where the system finds itself now, purports to contribute to the
expansion of democracy, building on the human rights tradition to fully incorporate
vulnerable groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, women, and the poor) into the enjoyment
of rights. In this phase, freedom of expression continues to play a key role. Democracy
requires free elections, but free elections are not enough. Democracy also requires
separation of powers, an independent and impartial judiciary, and a congress to provide
a sufficient check on executive power. It requires a vibrant civil society whose potential
cannot be achieved in the absence of free expression. This third phase of change, building
on the expansion of human rights, is being challenged by claims to change that stress
charismatic actors, or centralization of power leading to restrictions on expression, and
its subordination to governments.
While these three phases generally allow us to understand the focus of the InterAmerican system in different historic periods, it is important to note that these phases
are not strictly separated. There are diverse elements of these phases in each of the
countries in the region.
Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal Education and
the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.815, 822 (2002).

16.

See generally Louis
CAL RIGHTS(1981).

17.
18.
19.
20.

American Declaration, supra note 2.
American Convention, supra note 2.
Id. art. 33(a).
Id. art. 33(b).

BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIHENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL
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teeing the protection of human rights, including compliance with decisions
of the Court and the Commission, falls to the political organs of the OAS,
especially its General Assembly.21
The Commission supervises compliance with the rules through its case
system, 22 country reports, 23 recommendations to member states, 24 reports on
the interpretation of human rights obligations, 25 and, for freedom of expression
in particular, through the activities of the Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression. 26 The Court reviews cases presented to it by the
21.

American Convention, supra note 2. Article 41(g) provides that the Commission "submit
an annual report to the General Assembly of the [OAS]." Id art. 41. Likewise, Article 65
establishes that in each regular session "the Court shall submit, for the Assembly's consideration, a report on its work during the previous year." Id. art. 65. It should be noted
that the performance of these organizations relative to fortifying freedom of expression
has been inadequate. See El Sistema Interamericano y los Derechos Humanos en la
Regidn (The Inter-American System and Human Rights Law in the Region), in LA LUCHA
ENAMfRICA LATINA (THE WAR AGAINST THEPOOR IN LATIN AMERICA) (Bernardo
CONTRA LAPOBREZA

22.

Kliksberg ed., 2000).
American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 44-51. The Commission opens cases either on
its own initiative or in response to petitions filed by individuals affected by the violation
of any right covered by the American Convention. See Claudio Grossman, Strengthening
the Inter-American Human Rights System: The Current Debate (Fortaleciendo el Sistema
Interamericanode Derechos Humanos: El Debate Actual) 92 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC.1 86,

188 (1998). Once the Commission analyzes a case, it publishes an opinion with respect
to the existence of the alleged violation and offers recommendations to the responsible
member state. If the state does not comply with the recommendation, the Commission
may also prepare a second report and offer the state a second opportunity to comply.
If the state still does not comply, the Commission may publicly reveal the result of the
report and its recommendations. This is the only possibility that exists relative to those
states that have not ratified the American Convention. For states that have ratified the
American Convention, the Commission may opt to either publish the report or present it
to the Court within three months after the first report is approved. When it appears before
the Court, the role of the Commission changes from that of judge to that of plaintiff. It
acts in the name and in representation of the victim (generally designating the original
complainants as its legal advisers). This case mechanism is one of the most efficient
means available to the Commission to review individual human rights violations. Id.
at

188-89. See also THOMAS

HUMAN RIGHTSIN THEAMERICAS97
BUERGENTHAL
ETAL., PROTECTING

(1982).
23.

ETAL., supra
BUERGENTHAL

note 22, at 140. Member states may write the Commission to

visit a country. These invitations may result from requests made by political organs,
Commission requests for an invitation, or the state's own initiative. A country visit is a

highly visible event directed at mobilizing public opinion. The visit is followed by the
publication of a report. This type of mechanism is useful for responding to massive and
24.

serious violations of human rights that require swift mobilization of public opinion. Id.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41. The Commission also prepares proposals
for declarations and treaties. Grossman, supra note 22, at 187-88.

25.

Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/

26.

RELE/INF.2/09, at 10 (30 Dec. 2009).
Grossman, supra note 22, at 189. The Commission has named working groups and
special rapporteurs to confront problems having a "collective component," including a
working group on prisons along with special rapporteurs on issues concerning women

and indigenous populations, as well as freedom of expression. All of the rapporteurs are
members of the Commission except the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.
See 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 7.
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Commission and by member states that have recognized its jurisdiction."
As of 2009, 120 contentious cases had been brought to the Court. 28
1. The Inter-American Commission
Individuals may file a petition against an American state before the Commission when one or more of his or her internationally protected rights
have been violated. These include rights contained in both the American
Convention and the American Declaration. 2 9
The Convention establishes procedures to submit and process individual
petitions, including admissibility, the possibility of a friendly settlement,
public and private hearings, discussion on the merits, and a report. 0
Once the Commission determines a petition is admissible, it opens a
case. The Commission can place itself at the disposal of the parties at all
times to facilitate reaching a friendly settlement. If the parties are unable to
reach asettlement that satisfies the Commission, it will consider the substance
of the allegations. If the Commission finds that the state has violated a right
protected by the Convention, it will adopt a report that includes measures
the state must implement to correct these violations. The report adopted by
the Commission is final for those states that have not ratified the American
Convention or, having ratified that treaty, have not accepted the jurisdiction
27.

28.

29.

30.

Grossman, supra note 22, at 188. The following countries have recognized the competency
of the Court: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at 188 n.8.
For a list of cases resolved or pending before the Court, see Annual Report of the IACHR
2009, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., O.A.S. Doc., OEA/Ser.LV/VI, doc. 51, rev. 1 (30 Dec.
2009), at 6, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng-2009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Annual Report]. The Court, like the Commission, can adopt provisional
measures in cases where the risk is "grave and imminent." See American Convention,
supra note 2, art. 63(2) (providing that "[iun cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and
when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such
provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration," and
"[w]ith respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the
Commission"). For example, in 2008 alone, the Court ordered provisional measures in
forty-one cases.
As of 2010, the following twenty-four countries have ratified this document: Argentina,
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As of 26 May 1999
Trinidad and Tobago suspended its ratification over the death penalty issue. Petitions
brought against the remaining states may only be brought to the Commission. These
states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Guyana, St. Kitts
& Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States.
Because both documents protect the right to freedom of expression, the interpretations
of both the Court and Commission under either document are applicable to both. See
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13; American Declaration, supra note 2, art.
4.
Id.
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of the Court. As an application of international law by a treaty based organ,
this report has, as a minimum, persuasive value."
The importance of the Commission's reports under the American Declaration has been strengthened by Advisory Opinion OC-1 0/89, which was
adopted by the Court on 14 July 1989. That Advisory Opinion states, inter
alia, that at least some, if not all, of the rights included in the American
Declaration have acquired normative value considering that the Declaration spells out the human rights obligations of states under the OAS Charter,
which has been ratified by every state in the Hemisphere. 32 Moreover, the
explicit mention of freedom of expression in the Democratic Charter adopted
on 11 September 2001, as well as the creation of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (the only permanent rapporteur in the
Americas to protect a single right) by the Summit of the Americas in April
1998, persuasively demonstrates the normative value of this important right.13
In the case where states have ratified the American Convention but not
declared their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the normative value of the Commission's Final Report is grounded in the treaty. The
same applies when states have accepted jurisdiction, the Commission decides
not to bring a case to the Court, and the state itself, which has been found
responsible for violating a human right, does not refer the case to the Court.
2. The Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court is competent to hear petitions submitted by the
Commission or by state parties to the American Convention that have
accepted its jurisdiction.34 The Court has both advisory and contentious

31.

See generally THOMAS

DE Los DERECHOsHUMANOS EN LAS
ET. AL, LA PROTECCION
BUERGENTHAL

(1990).
AMERICAS

32.

33.
34.

"The General Assembly of the OAS has repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source of international obligations for OAS member states." Interpretation
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-1 0/89,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, 1 42 (14 July 1989), available at http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/opiniones/ seriea_10_ing1.doc (quoting OAS/GS Resolution 314 (VII-0/77),
OAS/GS Resolution 371 (VIII-0/78), OAS/GS Resolution 370 (VIll-0/78), and Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, Preamble, (entered into
force 28 Feb. 1987), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3620.htm).
OF SANTIAGO,Second Summit of the Americas (18-19 Apr. 1998), in Official
DECLARATION
Documents of the Summit Process from Miami to Santiago, Vol. I, Office of Summit
Follow-up, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/chiledec.htm.
The Court was established in 1979 in San Jose, Costa Rica, an autonomous judicial
institution of the Inter-American system. As of 2010, the following twenty-one states have
accepted the Court's jurisdiction: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See

2009 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 3.
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jurisdiction. In its contentious role, cases arise from the proceedings at
the Commission level. If the state does not comply with the Commission's
report within three months, the Commission may decide to bring the case
to the Court and/or publish the report. The Court's judgments are binding
and may not be appealed. The Court retains jurisdiction over cases where
it has decided to monitor compliance.3 s
In its advisory role, the Court may interpret the Convention as well as
any other human rights treaties in force in the member states. It may also
review the compatibility of such treaties with the domestic laws of member
states.16 Twenty-one advisory opinions have been adopted to date.37 Two
advisory opinions directly relate to freedom of expression: Advisory Opinion
OC-05/85, "Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law
for the Practice ofJournalism" ("Advisory Opinion OC-05/85") and Advisory
Opinion OC-07/86, "Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction"
("Advisory Opinion OC-07/86").1These Opinions contribute to defining the
scope of the human rights obligations assumed by the states-including the
right to freedom of expression. In its first decision concerning this right, the
As provided in the Commission's Rules of Procedure, revised in 2001, the Commission
will not present a case to the Court if so decided by the majority of the Commission's
members (four out of seven). If the case is not sent to the Court or if it has been adopted
and the country has not complied with the Commission's report, the Commission may
decide to publish its findings.
35.

2009 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 3.

36.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 64(1), (2). Article 64 establishes that:
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of
this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American
states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the
Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with
opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international
instruments.

37.
38.

For a list of the Court's advisory opinions, see Judgments and Opinions, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones.cfm.
Advisory Opinions OC-5/85 and OC-7/86 also refer to the right to freedom of expression
and further interpret its legal regime. In Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, the Court recognized
journalism as a "principal manifestation of freedom of expression." It further concluded
that the compulsory membership to a colegioor an association as a prerequisite to practice
journalism would violate the right of an individual who seeks to disseminate his or her
information and ideas, as well as "the right of the public at large to receive information
without any interference." Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 1 71, 81; Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1) and 2 American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, (ser. A), No. 7, 1 25, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(29 Aug. 1986), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea-07-ing.doc

[hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-07/861. In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, the Court
stated, "in regulating the application of the right of reply or correction, the States Parties
must respect the right of freedom of expression." However, the Court cautioned state
parties to not "interpret the right of freedom of expression so broadly as to negate the
right of reply [or correction]."
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Court declared that compulsory membership in a professional association
for the practice of journalism violates the Convention.39
3. The Office of the Special Rapporteur
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression ("Special
Rapporteur") was created by the Commission in 1998 to protect and promote
freedom of expression in the Americas. 40 The Special Rapporteur's principal
activities include: 1)the preparation of general and specific thematic reports;
2) the creation of a hemispheric network for the protection of freedom of expression; 3) visits to OAS member states to observe the freedom of expression
climate; and 4) the promotion of the right to freedom of expression among
OAS member states. 4 1 Unlike other rapporteurships, the office is dedicated
exclusively to the protection and promotion of freedom of expression.42
The Office of the Special Rapporteur has contributed significantly to the
protection of freedom of expression and shed further light on the interpretation
of both the American Declaration and the American Convention. Its annual
reports provide in-depth analysis of the overall situation of freedom of expression throughout the hemisphere, as well as the specific trends affecting the
development of this right in the region. In October 2000, the Commission,
interpreting the American Convention, adopted the Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression to guide the activities of the Special Rapporteur. 43
This document sets forth thirteen principles to govern freedom of expression in the Americas.4 4 Because these principles were adopted unanimously
by an authoritative organ of the OAS-the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights-treaty obligations have presumptively normative value. On
the other hand, nothing could prevent a state from challenging its value by
requesting an Advisory Opinion from the Court or challenging them in a
concrete case. These principles, however, have yet to be challenged, thus
strengthening the argument that their legal value has been confirmed.

39.
40.
41.

Advisory Opinion OL-05/85, supra note 1.
1998 Annual Report, supra note 19, ch. II, § 5.
1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 9-10.

43.

Further reinforcing the importance that the Commission places on freedom of expression, its Special Rapporteur is the only Rapporteur that works on a full-time basis.
Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., 108th Reg. Sess., approved 19 Oct. 2000, available at http://www.iachr.org/declaration.htm.

44.

Id.

42.
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B. The Legal Regime

The right to freedom of expression in the Inter-American system is regulated
by Articles 13 and 14 of the American Convention,45 as well as in Article
446 of the American Declaration. 47 This section will focus on the protection
of the right to freedom of expression under the American Convention. Its
analysis is helpful, however, in understanding the overall regime protecting
this right, which includes the American Declaration. Several factors have
led to the emergence of a unified legal regime on the right to freedom of
expression. The Convention elaborates the content of human rights obligations laid down by the American Declaration, including the right to freedom
45.

Article 13 of the American Convention expressly states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior
censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly
established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of
government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used
in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication
and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by
law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection
of childhood and adolescence;
Article 14 adds:
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in
general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that may have been
incurred.
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television company, shall have a person responsible who is not protected
by immunities or special privileges.

46.
47.

American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 13, 14.
Article 4 of the American Declaration provides that "[e]very person has the right to
freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas,
by any medium whatsoever." American Declaration, supra note 2, art. 4.
With the 11 September 2001 approval of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the
political organs of the OAS were given the possibility of suspending a government's
membership in the case of mass and grave human rights violations. In particular, the
Democratic Charter specifically mentions freedom of expression as a right to be protected. Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted 11 Sept. 2001, OEA/Ser.G/CP-1,
at 11 (2003), available at http://cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic23.IA/20Domocratic/ 20
Charter.htm [hereinafter Democratic Charter].
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of expression. In addition, the interpretations and scope of this right under
both documents are conducted by the same organ, i.e., the Commission. 48
As a result, a unified regime has emerged.
The Court has interpreted freedom of expression in cases such as: Baruch
lvcher-Bronstein v, Peru,49 Juan Pablo Olmedo v. Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ),5 0 Palamara-Iribarne v Chile,"' Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica,52
Canese v. Paraguay,

Claude Reyes v. Chile,5 4 Kimel v. Argentina,s Perozo

et al. v. Venezuela,1 Rios et al. v. Venezuela," Tristin-Donoso v. Panam" 5 1
Valle-Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia,59 Us6n-Ramirez v. Venezuela,60 and L6pezAlvarez v. Honduras. 61
6

48.

49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See generally 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8; The Democratic
Charter, supra note 47, art. 4. The Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression, an important framework for the interpretation of the right to freedom of
expression, was unanimously adopted by the principal organ of the OAS in 2001. It provides valuable insight into the different ways in which the Commission views the duties
of states concerning freedom of expression. Resorting to classical notions of the theories
of sources of international law, the value of this interpretation is that of the opinions of
international law publicists, as a minimum. Inter-American Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression, supra note 43.
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (6 Feb. 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-54_ing.doc. On 6 February
2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (to which the lvcher-Bronstein case
had been referred by the Commission) confirmed the Commission's finding that Peru
was responsible for violating Ivcher's right to freedom of expression.
Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile ("The Last Temptation of Christ"), Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (5 Feb. 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_ 73-ing.doc.
Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135 (22 Nov. 2005),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 35_ing.doc.
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107(2 July 2004),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 07- ng.doc.
Canese v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111 (31 Aug. 2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 111 _ing.doc.
Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (19 Sept.
2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-I51 ing.doc.
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177 (2 May 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_1 77_ing.pdf.
Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195 (28 Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_1 95- ng.pdf.
Rios et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 194 (28 Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-j 94-ing.pdf.
Tristin-Donoso v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193 (27 Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-193-ing.pdf.
Valle-Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192 (27
Nov. 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_1 92_ing.
pdf.
Us6n-Ramfrez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193 (20 Nov.
2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-207-ing.pdf.
L6pez-Alvarez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141 (1 Feb. 2006),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-I 41 _ing.pdf.
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The Commission has interpreted the right to different aspects of freedom of expression in cases such as:62 Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic of
Argentina," Martorell v. Chile,6 4 Hector Felix Miranda v. Mexico,65 Horacio
Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina, 66 Alejandra Matus Acuiia and Others v.
Chile, 67 Victor Manuel Oropeza v. Mexico,68 Dudley Stokes v Jamaica,'6
and Hugo Bustios Saavedra v. Peru, 70 among others.
1. The Scope of Freedom of Expression
Subsection one of Article 13 of the American Convention establishes the
right of individuals to think and express themselves freely.71 It also details
what freedom of expression means-"to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers"-and emphasizes that
the medium used is irrelevant, as expression can be communicated "either
orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium

of one's choice." 72
The jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court interprets the right
to freedom of expression as prohibiting prior censorship and authorizing only
the subsequent imposition of liability, except in exceptional situations laid
down by Article 13(4) for the "moral protection" of young people.7 1 It has
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Some cases were not referred to the Court; however, these Commission reports provide
relevant criteria concerning freedom of expression.
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic of Argentina, Case 2137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 45/78, OEA/Ser.L.N.11.47 (1978), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/78eng/Argentina.2137.htm. This case is based on the rights protected in the American Declaration.
Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 11/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.95, doc. 7 rev. (1996), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/Chilel1230.htm.
Miranda v. Mexico, Case 11.739, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/99, OEA/Ser.L.N.
11.102 doc. 6 (1998), available athttp://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Mexico
11739.htm.
Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina, Case 11.012, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 22/94,
OEA/Ser.L.N./II.88 doc. 9, rev. 1, at 40 (1995), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/94eng/
Argentinal 101 2.htm.
Alejandra Matus Acuhia et al. v. Chile, Case 12.142, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
90/05, OEA/Ser.LN//II.124 doc. 5 (2005), available athttp://cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/
Chilel 2142eng.htm.
Oropeza v. Mexico, Case 11.740, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 130/99, OEA/
Ser.L.N./II.106 doc. 6 (1999), available at http://cidh.orglannualrep/99eng/Merits/
Mexicol 1.740.htm.
Dudley Stokes v. Jamaica, Case 12.468, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 23/08, OEA/
Ser/L/V/II.131 doc. 29 (2008), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/
Jamaical 2468eng.htm.
Hugo Bustfos Saavedra v. Peru, Case 10.548, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 38/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/l.98 doc. 6 rev. (1997), available at http://www.iachr.orglannualrep/97eng/
Perul 0548.htm.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1).

Id.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4) (providing that "lnlotwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior
censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of
childhood and adolescence").
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also established the scope of permissible restrictions of this right that may
apply in emergency situations. 7' All forms of speech are protected by the
right to freedom of expression, including speech that isoffensive, shocking,
or disturbing to the state or other groups. 71 The Inter-American system has
found that freedom of expression includes the right to denounce human rights
violations by public officials.76 This highlights the connection between the
Inter-American system's role in protecting speech and guaranteeing access
to justice, which are both crucial to the fight against impunity.77
The Inter-American system has also identified three different types of
specially protected speech, which include: "(a) political speech and speech
involving matters of public interest; (b) speech regarding public officials in
the exercise of their duties and candidates for public office; and (c)speech
that isan element of the identity or personal dignity of the person expressing
herself."78 All of these forms of specially protected speech demonstrate the
connection existing between speech and democracy; they encourage vibrant
debate. Candidates and public officials should be subject to more public
and voter scrutiny because they chose to enter into the public domain. The
effort to protect speech that is connected to identity is intended to protect
vulnerable groups, highlighting the fact that democracy is strengthened
when everyone in society is heard and counts. These categories of speech
are particularly relevant in the balancing of different factors for the assessment of liability. Both the Commission and Court have repeatedly affirmed
that in the Inter-American system there is a strong connection between the
right to freedom of expression and democracy. 9
The interpretative work of the Commission and the Court has resulted
in the following characteristics of the scope of freedom of expression within
the context of the Inter-American system: 0 (a) special dual character; (b)
indivisibility of expression and dissemination of ideas; (c) multiplicity of

74.

Office of the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Legal
Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/

Ser.LN//IICIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09, 67 (2010), available at http://www.cidh.org/relatorial
showarticle.asp?artlD=1 69&IID=1.
75.
76.
77.

Id. 1 29-30.
Id. 42.

See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (14 Mar. 2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 75-ing.pdf. Following the process of elections that took place after the period of rampant human rights
violations in the 1970s, there were amnesty laws passed in many countries to cover
the perpetrators of these crimes with immunity. The Inter-American Court ruled that this
was against the Convention.

78.

Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression 2010,
32.
supra note 74,

79.
80.

Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 39.
Some of these characteristics may overlap with later sections. The author has deemed it
advisable to keep these sections separate either because supervisory organs have done
so or so as to clarify a topic.
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forms of expression; (d) protection of the means required to disseminate
ideas; (e)protection of reproduction of expression; (f)exclusion of direct and
indirect restrictions; and (g)incompatibility of public and private monopolies
in information media with the right to freedom of expression.
a. Special Dual Character
Freedom of expression possesses a special dual character in that it not only
involves the right of individuals to express themselves, but also the right to
receive information and ideas." Thus, as the Court explains in its Advisory
Opinion OC-05/85, a violation of the right to freedom of expression not only
infringes on an individual right, but also on "a collective right to receive
any information whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed
by others."82
The Court advanced this interpretation in the case The Last Temptation
of Christ, where it held that "freedom of expression is a way of exchanging ideas and information between persons; it includes the right to try and
communicate one's point of view to others, but it also implies everyone's
right to know opinions, reports, and news ."83
The Commission has had several opportunities to discuss this characteristic further. In the case of Martorell v. Chile, where censorship of the book
Impunidad Diplomitica (Diplomatic Impunity) was at issue, the Commission
asserted that, "arbitrary interference that infringes this right affects not just
the individual right to express information and ideas but also the right of
the community as a whole to receive information and ideas of all kinds." 84
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case expands on this dual character.
The case was initiated when the Peruvian government deprived the majority shareholder and director of the Peruvian television channel Frecuencia
Latina-Canal 2 (Latin Frequency-Channel 2) of his Peruvian nationality. The
government's action was in retaliation for the channel's broadcast of various reports of human rights violations committed by the Fujimori regime in
Peru during 1990-2000."1 Because foreigners could not own television or
radio stations in Peru, the removal of Ivcher-Bronstein's Peruvian citizenship resulted in his forced withdrawal from the directorship of the channel.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 30.
Id.
Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, 166 (5 Feb.
2001), available at http://www.corteidh.orcr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-73-ing.doc.
Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 11/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/
53 (1996), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/Chilel 1230.
11.95, doc. 7 rev.,
htm.
See generally lvcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (6
Feb. 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54-ing.
doc.
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The new owners fired the journalists who had produced the programs and
ceased the broadcast of negative news about the regime.86
While litigating this case, the Commission asserted that the social
character of the right to freedom of expression was much broader than its
individual aspects; it protects all those who seek out and receive information
or opinions emitted by the media. 7 In this case, the Commission argued,
and the Court upheld, that all of society is victimized when an individual's
freedom of expression is violated."
The Commission expanded upon this interpretation in Oropeza v.
Mexico. In that case, the Commission affirmed that freedom of expression is
a universal legal concept in which individuals are able to express, transmit,
receive, and disseminate thoughts. 9 Accordingly, both the Commission and
the Convention have consistently reaffirmed the dual character of the right
of freedom of expression.
b. Indivisibility of Expression and Dissemination of Ideas
In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court defined the scope of indivisibility
of expression and dissemination, stating: "restrictions that are imposed on
dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on the right
to express oneself freely."90 Furthermore, it asserted that the importance of
the legal rules applicable to the press derives from this concept." Finally,
it added that "[flor the average citizen it is just as important to know the
opinions of others or to have access to information generally as is the very
right to impart his own opinions."92
The Court had an opportunity to expand on this issue in Palamara
Iribarne v. Chile. In that case, the Chilean government had seized and destroyed all hard and electronic copies of the book Ethics and Intelligence
Services and prohibited its distribution.93 The Court held that in guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression, the state must not only protect the

86.
87.
88.
89.

90
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. 31.
See generally Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54.
Oropeza v. Mexico, Case 11.740, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 130/99, OEA/
51 (1999), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/
Ser.L.N./l.1 06 doc. 6,
Mexicoll.740.htm (citing Annual Report 1980-1981, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/
Ser.L./V/Il, at 122). In this case, a Mexican journalist was allegedly assassinated for
criticizing government authorities in his newspaper column, which included references
to links between the police and drug trafficking. Id. 1 2.
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 1 31.
Id.
Id. 32.
Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 1 2 (22 Nov.
2005), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-135-ing.doc.
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individual expression itself, but also its dissemination "through whichever
appropriate medium." 94
The Commission took an analogous approach in Martorell v. Chile,
where it stated that "the decision to ban the entry, circulation, and distribution of the book 'Impunidad diplomitica' in Chile violates the right to
impart 'information and ideas of all kinds,'"9 protected under the right to
freedom of expression.
As these cases demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
system has strongly upheld the indivisibility of expression and dissemination of ideas.
c. Multiplicity of Forms of Expression
The right to freedom of expression is not limited to verbal expression; all
types of expression are protected, including silence.16 TheJehovah's Witnesses
v. Republic of Argentina case is an example of the broad scope of the right
to freedom of expression developed by the Inter-American jurisprudence.
In 1976, the Argentine military dictatorship promulgated Decree No.
1867/76, which prohibited the public exercise of the Jehovah's Witness
religion in Argentina.97 The government alleged that this religion was based
on principles contrary to the Argentine nationality and basic state institutions.98 As a result of the decree, followers of the religion were persecuted.99
More than 300 children were expelled from school after being accused of
refusing to swear allegiance to the country or to sing the Argentine national
anthem 00 The students opted instead for silence because their religion
prohibited them from engaging in such veneration of national symbols.10
Pursuant to Resolution No. 02/79, the Commission condemned the action
94.
95.

96.
97.

Id. 73.
Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 11/96, OEA/Ser.LN/
11.95, doc. 7 rev. 59 (1996), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/Chilel 1230.
htm. Similarly, in Miranda v. Mexico, the Commission found that the failure to investigate
and punish the mastermind behind the assassination of a journalist constituted an illegal
interference with the right of every citizen to "receive information freely and to learn
the truth about the events that took place." Miranda v. Mexico, Case 11.739, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/99, OEA/Ser.L.N.II.102 doc. 6, 56 (1998), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.orgfannualrep/98eng/Merits/Mexico 11739.htm. In that case, the
co-director of a Mexican weekly publication (Zeta) was assassinated for authoring and
publishing opinions critical of the government.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic of Argentina, Case 2137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 45/78, OEA/Ser.L.N.I.47, 1 1 (1978), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/78eng/
Argentina.2137.htm.

98.

Id.

99.
100.

Id. I N 2, 4-7.
Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25 NOVA L. REv. 411, 426 (2001).
Id.

101.
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of the Argentine government, which it considered to be responsible for the
alleged violations. 102
As exemplified by the Commission's resolution in the Jehovah's Witnesses case, all forms of expression, including silence, are protected under
the right to freedom of expression.
d. Protection of the Means Necessary to Disseminate Ideas
Having asserted the right to disseminate opinions and ideas, both the Commission and the Court determined that the American Convention provides
that freedom of thought and expression includes the right to disseminate
information and ideas by any means. 03 In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the
Court affirmed that "freedom of expression ... cannot be separated from the
right to use whatever medium is deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to
have them reach as wide an audience as possible."' 04 The Commission asserted in its complaint in the Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed
above, that the American Convention consecrates the right to disseminate
information and ideas in an artistic form or by any other means. 0
e. Protection of Reproduction of Information
The right to freedom of expression includes the right to reproduction of
expression originating from others. In the Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica case,
the state of Costa Rica convicted the petitioner on the criminal charge
of defamation based on the contents of several articles published by the
newspaper La Naci6n.'0 6 These articles, which previously appeared in the
Belgian press, attributed illegal acts to Costa Rica's honorary representative
to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Austria.' 7 Costa Rican law
required that the petitioner prove the veracity of the facts reported in the
European press and later reproduced in La Naci6n in order to avoid liability.'0 The Court found this standard to be incompatible with Article 13 of
the Convention and that it "has a deterrent, chilling and inhibiting effect
on all those who practice journalism . . . [that] obstructs public debate on
issues of interest to society."' 0
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic of Argentina, Case 2137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 45/78, OEA/Ser.L./V.ll.47, 1 1.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 31.
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Complaint of the Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., at
27 (on file with author) [hereinafter Ivcher-Bronstein Complaintl.
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 1 3 (2 July
2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_107_ing.doc.
Id.
Id. 132.
Id.
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In Dudley Stokes v. Jamaica, the petitioner, Dudley Stokes, editor of
several prominent Jamaican newspapers, reprinted an article published by
the Associated Press about a US investigation into kickbacks allegedly given
to the former Jamaican Minister of Tourism, Eric Abrahams.' 10The Associated
Press withdrew the report the day after it was published, but did not send
notice to the Jamaican media."' Three days after the story was published in
Jamaica, the petitioner published a statement based on a denial issued by
Abrahams.'12 However, a trial court found him guilty of libel and awarded
Abrahams J$80.7 million.' Stokes appealed the amount of damages originally awarded and obtained a reduction to J$35 million. Subsequently, the
Commission found that the petitioner never appealed the domestic finding
of his guilt and, therefore, this issue was deemed "not exhausted in domestic
courts" and was not considered by the Commission.114 Despite having found
the petition admissible in 2004 to address issues of proportionality of the
damages, the Commission ultimately denied the petitioner's request for a
hearing and found the state did not violate the petitioner's right to freedom
of expression.' The Commission's decision raises serious procedural and
substantive issues because it did not afford a hearing to the petitioner and
determined that issues of proportionality should be decided by domestic
legal systems without providing any guidance in that regard. Since Jamaica
has not accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the decision was final. However, as discussed below, in Kimel v. Argentina the Court had the
opportunity to do what the Commission failed to do: develop the notion of
proportionality. 1 6
Penalizing the reproduction of information originating from third parties,
in the absence of malice or grave negligence, would seriously restrict the
free flow of ideas in an increasingly complex global reality where information flows from multiple and often distant actors. The exclusion of liability
for reproducing this type of information does not, however, imply excluding liability of those with whom the information originated (e.g., malicious
statements of fact) or the liability of those who reproduce such information
with malice or grave negligence.' 17

110.
111.
112
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Dudley Stokes v. Jamaica, Case 12.468, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 23/08,
18 (2008), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 doc. 29,
annualrep/2008eng/Jamaical 2468eng.htm.
Id. 50.
Id. 11 55-56.
Id. 25.
Id. 1 80.
Id. 11 16, 83.
See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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f. Exclusion of Direct and Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of the American Convention prohibits restrictions
on freedom of expression that are carried out by indirect means designed to
impede communication."' The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
has defined indirect measures as those that, although not "designed strictly
speaking to restrict the freedom of expression . .. .[nonetheless, in practice
... have an adverse impact on the free circulation of ideas."" 9 Unlike direct
restrictions, these are harder to detect and consequently, rarely investigated.
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed above, provides an
example of an indirect restriction on freedom of expression. In this case,
the government did not use traditional restrictions such as libel, contempt
laws, censorship, or political persecution to silence Bronstein. Instead, the
regime stripped him of his nationality to achieve this goal. 2 0
Since then, the Inter-American jurisprudence has expanded on the concept of indirect restrictions. In the Canese v. Paraguay case, the Commission
recognized punitive measures as an indirect restriction to freedom of expression. Mr. Canese was a journalist who wrote about allegations of corruption
against the powerful presidential candidate Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Canese
was fired from the newspaper where he worked and criminal proceedings
were brought against him. He was sentenced to four months imprisonment
and not allowed to leave Paraguay. The Commission stated that "[tihe inhibiting effect of the punitive measure can generate self-censorship of a person
who wishes to speak out, which produces almost the same effect as direct
censorship: 'opinions do not circulate."" 21 In that case, the Court determined
that "the criminal proceeding, the consequent sentence imposed on Canese
. . . and the restrictions to leave the country during almost eight years and
four months constituted an indirect means of restricting his freedom of
thought and expression."' 22 Using that law to the fullest extent, the government limited "the open debate on topics of public interest or concern and
restricted Canese's exercise of freedom of thought and expression to omit
his opinions for the remainder of the electoral campaign." 23
In one of the most recent cases addressing indirect restrictions, Perozo
et al. v. Venezuela, the Court noted that there must be an actual restriction

118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(3).
Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2004, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/II.122. doc. 5, rev. 1, ch. V, 1 9 ( 2005), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/docListCat.asp?catlD=39&IID=1 [hereinafter 2004
Report of the Special Rapporteurj.
Ivcher-Bronstein Complaint, supra note 105.
72(g) (31 Aug.
Canese v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.111,
2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 11 ling.doc.
Id.
107.
Id.
106.
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of speech in order for a violation to occur.124 In this case the Court found
that the government of Venezuela had not violated the victim's rights per
se, but it had failed its obligation to protect them from indirect restrictions

by private actors.125

In addition, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has been
investigating new indirect means employed to restrict this right as they
emerge in the region. In its 2003 Annual Report, the Rapporteur evaluated
how the unregulated use of official publicity could be transformed into a
restriction. For example, the abuse of funding distribution policies to benefit
those who favor the government or its agents punishes those media agencies
that seek a more critical approach. The Rapporteur illustrated that although
"[t]here exists no inherent right to receive government advertising revenue
. . . [the state] cannot deny publicity income only to specific outlets based
on discriminatory criteria." 126
g. Incompatibility of Public and Private Monopolies in
Information Media with the Right to Freedom of Expression
Both the Court and the Commission have confirmed that the existence of
public and private monopolies impedes the dissemination of individual
ideas as well as the reception of the opinions of others. As a result, the
existence of monopolies in the media industry is inconsistent with freedom
of expression. In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court stated that "[ilt is
the mass media that make[s] the exercise of freedom of expression a reality."1 27 To ensure that this medium is not restricted, the Court determined
that there must be "a plurality of means of communication, the barring of
all monopolies . . . and guarantees for the protection of the freedom and

independence of journalists."128
In Baruch lvcher-Bronstein v. Peru, the Commission affirmed that the
free circulation of ideas is only conceivable where there are multiple sources
of information in addition to respect for the media. 12 9 The Commission explained that it is not enough to guarantee the right to establish mass media;
124.

125.
126.

127.
128.
129.

118 (28
See Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195,
Jan. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_195 ing.pdf.
See also Rios et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 194, 1 108
(28 Jan. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_1 94_ing.
pdf.
Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195, 1 161.
Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2003, Inter-Am. Comm'n
12 (2003), availH.R, O.A.S. Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/L1 18, doc. 70, rev. 2, vol. III, ch. V,
able at http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/docListCat.asp?catlD=23&lID=1 [hereinafter
2003 Report of the Special Rapporteur].
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 1, 1 34.
Id.
Ivcher-Bronstein Complaint, supra note 105, at 28.
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it is also necessary that journalists and other professionals working in the
media be able to do so with the protections that the free and independent
exercise of free expression this work requires. 130 Furthermore, the Special
Rapporteur has stated that "assignments of radio and television broadcast
frequencies should consider democratic criteria that guarantee equal opportunities of access for all individuals." 131 In a further expansion of the right
of freedom of expression, the Inter-American Court, in the case of Kimel v.
Argentina, 13 2 stated that the "plurality of the media and the prohibition of
all types of monopolies in relation thereto, whatever be the form they may
adopt, is imperative.""' The Court thereby established a positive state obligation to adopt a normative framework that would guarantee the exclusion
of monopolies in information media.
2. Prohibition of Prior Censorship
One of the principal characteristics of the right of freedom of expression in
the Inter-American system is that it only allows for prior censorship when
used to regulate public entertainment in order to safeguard the morals of
children and adolescents. 13 4 Subsection two of Article 13 of the Convention
provides that freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship,
but "shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability.""' The Declaration of Principles holds that direct or indirect prior censorship restricts the

130.
131.

132.
133.
134.

Id.
2004 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 119, ch.V, 1 36, citing a 2003 press
release on an official visit to Honduras by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Press Release, Office of the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Upon Concluding his Official Visit to Honduras, the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Urges the Government to Abolish the Required
Association of journalists and the Crime of Desacato (2003), available at http://www.
cidh.org/relatorialshowarticle.asp?artlD= 14&IID=1.
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177 (2 May 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-I 77-ing.pdf.
Id. 57 n. 51. See also Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 34.
Paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the American Convention states: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior
censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection
of childhood and adolescence." American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4). The
rejection of prior censorship is so strong in the Inter-American system that paragraph 5
provides only subsequent criminal punishment for war propaganda and incitements to
racial and religious hatred:
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute
incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of
persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall
be considered as offenses punishable by law.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(5).
135.

Id. art. 13(2).
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free circulation of ideas and opinions, which violates the right to freedom
of expression.'3 6
This prohibition responds to the danger of creating filters capable of
determining what individuals can hear, see, or read. Therefore, the American
Convention rejects resort to justifications such as "national security," "morality," or "good habits" that could easily be used as pretexts to eliminate or
encroach upon the free expression of ideas."'
In the Western Hemisphere, both the Court and the Commission have
had the opportunity to interpret the prohibition of prior censorship including: (a)the exclusion of the defense of honor as a basis for prior censorship;
and (b)identifying the scope of authorized exceptions.
a. Exclusion of Defense of Honor as a Basis for Prior
Censorship

Some state parties have used the right to privacy found in Article 11 of the
Convention"" as a basis for restricting the right to freedom of expression
136.
137.

2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 3, ch. II, 1 41, quoting Inter-American
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 43, principle 5.
In contrast to the Americas, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms allows for exceptions in specific situations when "prescribed
by law and . . . necessary in a democratic society." These exceptions, that as such need
to be interpreted restrictively, are subject to scrutiny by the European Court. European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept.
1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. Article 10 states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

138.

Id. art. 10. However, in practice, European organs have been reluctant to apply prior
censorship norms, signaling a broad interpretation of freedom of expression that minimizes the censorship option. See, e.g., 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra
note 8, ch. II, § B(3) (citing The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245
(1979) and discussing how, in interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, the
European Court for Human Rights "concluded that 'necessary,' while not synonymous
with 'indispensable,' implied 'the existence of a 'pressing social need' and that, for a
restriction to be 'necessary,' it is not enough to show that it is 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or
'desirable"').
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 11:
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family,
his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
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protected in Article 13. The basis of their argument is that defense of honor
should be excluded from the prior censorship prohibition.
The state of Chile, for example, set forth this argument in Martorell v.
Chile. The Chilean government and judiciary maintained that in the event
of a conflict between Articles 11 (right to privacy) and 13 (right to freedom
of expression) of the American Convention, the former must prevail."' In
deciding the case, the Commission rejected this theory and advanced its
interpretation that the rights included in those two articles of the American
Convention do not present a conflict of different principles from which one
must be chosen. 140 Accordingly, the Commission quoted the European Court
on Human Rights, which, in a similar case, considered that it was "faced
not with a choice between conflicting principles, one of which is freedom
of expression, but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject
to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted." 14 1
The Commission reiterated this interpretation of Article 13 in its arguments in The Last Temptation of Christ.142 In that case, the Chilean government prohibited the distribution of the film "The Last Temptation of Christ,"
arguing it did so to protect the "honor and reputation of Christ." 143 The
Commission, in turn, replied that the "honor of the individual should be
exercise of freedom of expression and the
protected without prejudicing4the
right to receive information." 4 In deciding the case, the Court upheld the
Commission's reasoning and stated that the prohibition of the movie "The
LastTemptation of Christ" constituted prior censorship in violation of Article

13 of the Convention.145
The Special Rapporteur acknowledged this interpretation in the 1998
report. In that report, the Rapporteur noted that states must respect the
right to freedom of expression when legislating the protection of honor and
dignity contained in Article 11 of the Convention and applying domestic
law on the subject.'4 1
b. Scope of Authorized Exceptions
The American Convention authorizes the following exception to its prohibition of prior censorship: censorship of public entertainment for the exclusive
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 11/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.95, doc. 7 rev., 1 63 (1996), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/Chilel l230.
htm.
Id. 11 62, 65, 75.
Id. 1 71 n.5 (quotingThe SundayTimes v. the United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1979)).
Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, 9161 (5 Feb.
2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec73-ing.doc. The
Commission argued subsequent liability is "only admissible in a restricted way, when
necessary to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others." See also id. 1 61(e).
Id. 1 61(h).
Id. 1 61(i).
Id. 1 72.
1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 21.
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purpose of regulating access to such events to protect the morals of children
and adolescents. 147 This exception, however, is only permitted within the
framework of the Inter-American system if it conforms to the requirements
of legality, necessity, reality or imminence, or valid purpose.148
In order to conform to the legality requirement, the exception must be
authorized by law. Accordingly, decrees or other administrative measures
would be insufficient. The requirement of necessity implies a case-by-case
evaluation of the pertinence of the measure, taking into account the peculiarities of each situation, and considering the lack of other less restrictive
means available to achieve the same valid purposes in order to exclude
improperly-motivated prohibitions. The reality or imminence requirement
refers to measures that are adopted in light of actually existing conditions
or those that are certain to occur, not mere hypothetical situations that may
affect the morals of children or adolescents (in public entertainments). The
valid purpose exception corresponds to cases involving children where
protection of morals is at issue. As of 2010, neither the Commission nor the
Court has had the opportunity to further interpret this provision.
3. Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American system's prohibition on prior censorship does not exclude
subsequent imposition of liability. But when subsequent liability is disproportionate, it effectively "gags" individuals who are faced with the threat of
serious "retaliation" for expressing their opinions, producing a chilling effect
for society at large. The American Convention sets forth specific requirements
to establish the validity of subsequent liability. These requirements have been
reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court. One of the latest cases in which
the Court addressed subsequent liability is Kimel v. Argentina.149 Kimel is
an investigative historian who published a book entitled La Masacre de San
Patricio in 1989.1so The book analyzed the killings of five clergymen of the
Palotine Order that occurred 4 July 1976 during the military dictatorship
in Argentina.'"' Kimel examined the judicial investigation into the massacre and referred to a judicial decision adopted on 7 October 1977.152 He
raised questions concerning the behavior of the federal judge in charge of
this case, alleging that the judge had complied with formal requirements,
but because of pressure from the military regime had not investigated the
truth."' The judge brought a criminal action against Kimel for defamation

147.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4).

148.

See id. art. 27.

149.

Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177 (2 May 2008), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 177-ing.pdf.
Id. 41.
Id.
Id. 11 41-42.
Id. 1 42.

150.
151.
152.
153.
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or alternatively "false imputation of a publicly actionable crime," both of
which are punishable by up to three years in prison according to Argentine
Criminal Code. 15 4 Kimel was found guilty of the latter and sentenced on 25
September 1995 to one year in prison and payment of 20,000 pesos. 155 The
Court found that the sentence violated the right to freedom of thought and
expression laid down by the American Convention."' On the basis of Kimel,
and other court decisions discussed below, the following requirements for
subsequent liability can be identified: 1) legality; 2) democratic legitimacy;
3) necessity; 4) proportionality; 5)value judgments; 6)differentiation between
opinions based on facts and value judgments; 7) preclusion of liability for
reproduction of information; and 8) strict regulation of contempt laws. These
requirements protect the right to freedom of expression in general, including,
"those that offend, shock or disturb the majority."'
Moreover, in the application of these requirements in a given case,
special consideration must be given to protected speech including, "(a)
political speech and speech involving matters of public interest; (b)speech
regarding public officials in the exercise of their duties and candidates for
public office; and (c) speech that is an element of the identity or personal
dignity of the person expressing herself."" This type of speech is essential
for democracy, and accordingly must be subject to rigorous scrutiny.
a. Legality

Article 13 of the American Convention provides that the subsequent imposition of liability should be expressly established by law.'1 9 This is confirmed in
Article 30,160 which provides that the restrictions "placed on the enjoyment
or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized [in the American Convention] may not be applied except in accordance with the purpose for which
such restrictions have been established." 161
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

161.

Id. 43.
Id. 45.
Id. 95.
1994 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V.88, doc. 9, rev.
1, ch. V, (1995), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/94eng/TOC.htm.
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, supra note 25, at 10.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(2).
Id. art. 30, which provides:
The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise
of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws
enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been established.
Id. See also The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-06/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6 (9 May 1986),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_06_ing.doc [hereinafter
Advisory Opinion OC-06/86].
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The Court's Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, The Word "Laws" in Article 30
of the American Convention on Human Rights, establishes that "the criteria
of Article 30 are applicable to all those situations where the word "laws" or
comparable expressions are used in the [American] Convention in referring
to the restrictions that the Convention itself authorizes with respect to each
one of the protected rights."162 Different consequences often arise from this
concept of legality. First, subsequent liability can be imposed only by statute
and not by an act of the executive. Second, a statute has less normative
value than a constitution and hence cannot narrow a constitutional norm.
Third, there is a prohibition on the retroactive application of restrictions,
based on the notion that no one can be responsible for conduct that, when
undertaken, was not illegal.
In Kimel v. Argentina, the Court had an opportunity to refer to subsequent
liability. The Court emphasized that the law must be clearly established, and
must provide clear guidance to individuals as to what constitutes permissible conduct.'6 Again, in the case Us6n-Ramfrez v. Venezuela, decided in
November 2009, the Court found that the Venezuelan law under which a
former General in the Venezuelan army was convicted of "slander against
the National Armed Forces" was far too vague to meet the legality threshold
of Article 13.164 Us6n-Ramfrez was sentenced to five years and six months in
prison for speaking on television about alleged criminal conduct that took
place at a military prison and "dishonoring the Venezuelan military."'6 The
Court ruled that the statute was too ambiguous to meet the legality requirement because it did not clearly establish the elements of the crime, nor did
66
it specify the mens rea needed for conviction.'
b. Democratic Legitimacy
The principle of legality is inextricably linked to that of legitimacy. Article
13 requires that in order to be valid, the imposition of liability must also be
legitimate.' 6 7 In Advisory Opinion-05/85, the Court affirmed that this principle should be understood as one requiring public authorities to conduct
themselves in strict conformity with the requirements set forth in both the
constitutional and Inter-American systems.' 68 In the Americas, legitimacy

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. 1 17.
63-66 (2 May
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177, 1
2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_1 77_ing.pdf.
Us6n-Ramirez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, i1 38,
56-57 (20 Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_207_ing.pdf.

Id.
Id.

38.

1 56.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13.
Advisory Opinion OC-06/86, supra note 161.
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requires the effective exercise of a representative democracy, including inter
alia, respect for divergent views.169
c. Necessity
The need for subsequent liability will depend on its origin and purpose,
namely, whether it is oriented toward satisfying a compelling public interest within the framework of a representative democracy. Among the means
that may be employed to meet this objective, the least restrictive should
be chosen."o Finally, whether "public order," "public morals," "national
security," "public health," or some other concept is invoked to establish
subsequent liability, such expressions should be subject to an interpretation
strictly tied to the just demands of a democratic society which, of course,
include freedom of expression.
Although the American Convention does not explicitly state the "necessity" requirement, the Court established that this requirement applies to
every article in the American Convention pursuant to Article 29.11"The latter
states that all articles of the Convention must be interpreted as protecting
representative democracy. 17 2 The Court, in its jurisprudence, acknowledged
the difference in terminology between the American Convention and Article
10 of the European Convention, which uses the expression "necessary in
a democratic society.""' The Court found that this difference is irrelevant
since the European Convention does not contain any provision comparable
with Article 29 of the American Convention.
Unfortunately, the Court in Kimel and Us6n-Ramirez did not rule that
criminal sanctions for speech violated the American Convention."' However,
in Kimel, the Court declared that criminal sanctions should be reserved for
extremely serious conduct, and be based upon information that "shows the
absolute necessity to resort to criminal proceedings." 7 7 In Us6n-Ramfrez
the Court expanded the right to honor to include not only individuals, but
169.
170.
171.

Id.

Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 1 46.
Id. 44. Article 29 of the American Convention provides as follows:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
(c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived
from representative democracy as a form of government; or
(d)excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
and other international acts of the same nature may have.

American Convention, supra note 2, art. 29(c), (d).
44.

172.
173.

Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1,
Id. IN 44-45.

174.

Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177, 1 78 (2 May 2008),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-177- ng.pdf.

175.

Id.
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also the government itself, reiterating that it did not rule criminal liability
out completely, but created a high threshold for imposing criminal liability
to protect the government's right to honor.176 In Tristin-Donoso v. Panama
the Court noted that factors such as the extreme seriousness of the conduct, actual malice, and unfair damage caused can be used to evaluate
the necessity of criminal proceedings.177 After evaluating those factors, the
Court found that the criminal punishment imposed on Tristin-Donoso was
unnecessary. 78 Therefore, while criminal liability has not been excluded,
the Court has developed strict requirements to evaluate whether there is
"absolute necessity" to resort to criminal law. Thus far, the Court has not
found absolute necessity in any case.
d. Proportionality
Subsequent liability should be in proportion to the end sought, whether the
end is to assure respect for individual rights, the reputation of third parties,
or the protection of "national security," "public order," "public health," or
"morals." This requirement has great importance, since excessive fines, detention, and imprisonment can have the same chilling effect as prior censorship.
In Kimel v. Argentina, the Court carefully balanced under a "strict proportionality" standard Kimel's right to express his opinion against the right
of the judge to have his honor respected, considering that both rights are
protected in the American Convention."' The Court found that the violation
of Kimel's right to freedom of expression outweighed the alleged impairment
of the right to have one's honor respected. 8 0 The harsh criminal sanction in
Us6n-Ramfrez was disproportionate to the goal of protecting the military's
honor, according to the Court, and proportionality should guide the behavior
of the state when exercising its punitive power.""
e. Value Judgments
The subsequent imposition of liability requires the existence of "actual
malice," understood as (i) the intentional disregard for the truth of facts,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

69 (20
Us6n-Ramirez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193,
Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_207-ing.
pdf.
SeeTristin-Donoso v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 1 120 (27
Jan. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193-ing.
pdf.
(d.
58 (2 May 2008),
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177,
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-I 77-ing.pdf.
Id. 94.
Us6n-Ramfrez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 1 87 (20
Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_207-ing.
pdf.
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or (ii) serious negligence.182 In its report on contempt, the Commission addressed the issue and established the "actual malice" standard as the only
one compatible with the Convention."' In its analysis, the Commission
found that the exceptio veritatis, or the need for the defendant to prove the
truthfulness of his statements, is abusive.184 It argued that asking such proof
from the defendant shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant against well-established legal principles. Moreover, in criminal cases,
it affects the defendant's presumption of innocence until guilt is proven.',,
In Kimel, while the court did not exclude the possibility of criminal sanctions, it stated explicitly that this possibility requires satisfaction of several
factors, including "actual malice."'1 6 In Tristin-Donoso v. Panama the Court
confirmed this approach." Tristgn-Donoso stated that Attorney General of
Panama intercepted his phone calls without any legal authorization. A court
in Panama however, determined that this was false and imposed a criminal
punishment and duty to compensate on Tristin-Donoso. The Court determined that this was disproportionate, because when Tristin-Donoso made
this statement it was a reasonable determination without malice or grave
negligence.18
f. Differentiation Between Opinions of Fact and Value
judgments
Value judgments do not create liability because they do not assert facts.
They are simply subjective opinions that individuals can freely determine
to be valid or invalid. This type of expression is protected in broad terms by
Article 13, which asserts that freedom of expression involves "the freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds." 9
In the Inter-American system, there is an explicit right not only to
"receive" information, but also to "disseminate" opinions.190 If subsequent
imposition of liability were permitted in the case of the dissemination of

183.
184.

1999 Report of the Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/ser.L.N./II.106, doc. 6, ch. II, § B(1)(a) (1999), available at http://www.cidh.
org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=1 35&llD=1 [hereinafter 1999 Report of the Special
Rapporteurl.
Id. ch. II, § B(1)(b).
Id.

185.

Id.

186.

78 (2 May 2008),
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.1 77,
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec1 77_ing.pdf.
120 (27
Tristin-Donoso v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193,
Jan. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193_ing.
pdf.
Id. 1 126.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 13(1).

182.

187.
188.
189.
190.
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value judgments, it would inhibit both the person who expresses the opinion and the debate in which different opinions are expressed. In Kimel the
Court stated:
The opinions expressed by Mr. Kimel can neither be deemed to be true nor false.
As such, an opinion cannot be subjected to sanctions, even more so where it is
a value judgment on the actions of a public official in the performance of his
duties. In principle, truthfulness or falseness may only be established in respect
of facts. Hence, the evidence regarding value judgments may not be examined
according to truthfulness requirements.191
In the case of Us6n-Ramfrez, the Court emphasized that it is in the best
interest of the public that the government be freely subject to public scrutiny.'9 The Court emphasized that opinions and reports about the government
should be allowed into the public discourse with great leeway to foster a
"truly democratic society."' 9 3

g. Strict Regulation of Contempt Laws with the American
Convention
Contempt laws
public officials
in at least nine
serted, through

provide punishment for offensive expressions directed at
in the fulfillment of their duties and are currently in force
OAS member states. 194 The Commission has repeatedly asits case law as well as in its Report on the Compatibility

of "Desacato" [Contempt] Laws with the American Convention on Human
Rights ("Report on Contempt Laws"), that such laws are incompatible with
freedom of expression.195
The Commission's report followed the friendly settlement in the Horacio Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina case that resulted in the elimination
of Argentina's contempt law.' 6 In that case, an Argentine journalist was
sentenced to one month in prison after being found guilty of contempt
when he referred to an Argentine Supreme Court justice as "disgusting" in
a national newspaper, Pigina 12.197 The Commission found that contempt

193.

Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177, 1 93 (2 May 2008),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 77-ing.pdf.
Us6n-Ramfrez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 1 83 (20
Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 207_ing.
pdf.
Id.

194.

2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 3, ch. II, at 19,

195.

1994 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LiV.88, doc. 9, rev. 1,
ch. V, (1995) available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/94eng/chap.5.htm [hereinafter

191.
192.

1 33.

Report on Contempt Laws].
196.
197.

Id. 1 20.
Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina, Case 11.012, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
22/94, OEA/Ser.L././II.88 doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 1, 19 (1995), available at http://cidh.org/
annualrep/94eng/Argentina11012.htm. The English version of the case points out that
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laws, when applied, directly affect the type of open debate guaranteed by
Article 13 that is essential to the existence of a democratic society.'98 The
Special Rapporteur expanded on the issue and stated that "contempt laws
seek to avoid debate as well as the scrutiny or criticism of state officials,"
and that these laws, "instead of protecting freedom of expression or civil
servants limit freedom of expression and weaken the democratic system." 99
The Court further clarified the issue in Canese v. Paraguay, finding that
a different threshold of protection of reputations should be applied to public
officials, individuals who exercise functions of a public nature, and politicians.2 00 This threshold is not based on the nature of the subject, but rather
on the characteristic of public interest inherent in the activities or acts of a

specific individual. 2 0 1
Furthermore, in Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, the Court observed that

those individuals who have an influence on matters of public interest have
laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense public scrutiny and,
consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of being
criticized. Their activities go beyond the private sphere and fall within the
realm of public debate.2 02
The Court in Kimel acknowledged that while protection of a person's
honor and reputation are legitimate ends, "public officials should be more

198.
199.

200.
201.
202.

the Spanish word used in Verbitsky's article was "asqueroso" and explains that the term
can mean either disgusting or disgusted. Horacio Verbitsky, Cicatrices de Dos Guerras,
PAGINA 12, 6 Mar. 1988.
Report on Contempt Laws, supra note 195, § 4(A).
1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, ch. IV,§ A, at 42. In a press release,
the Special Rapporteur stated his opposition to an Argentine court decision that sentenced
the journalist Eduardo Kimel to one year in jail and a fine. Press Release, Office of the
Special Reporter for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., The Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression Expresses his Opposition to Judicial Decision in Argentina
(16 Apr. 1999), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/human%20rights/freedomexpression-1999.htm. He noted that the Court has stated that, in a democratic society,
political and public figures should be more open to public scrutiny and criticism, and
that open debate, which is crucial to a democratic society, must necessarily include
those persons who participate in the creation or the application of public policy. Id.
Since these individuals are at the center of public debate and are knowingly exposed
to public scrutiny, they must display greater tolerance toward criticism. Id.
The United Nations Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression for the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the OAS Special Rapporteur stated in a joint
resolution that laws exist in many countries, such as contempt laws, that unduly limit
the right to freedom of expression, and they urged states to amend those laws in order
to bring them in line with their international obligations. 1999 Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 182, Annex 2, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/
human%20rights/freedom-expression-1 999.htm.
Canese v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.111, 100 (31 Aug. 2004),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec1 11 .ing.doc.
Id.
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 1 129 (2
July 2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 107_ing.
doc.
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tolerant of criticism from individuals."203 However, the Court found in
Us6n-Ramirez that Venezuela does have a legitimate interest in protecting
the military's honor and that imposing subsequent liability on freedom of
expression may be justified.2 04 In both cases, while the Court did not exclude
criminal sanctions, it set the bar high,2 05 a jurisprudential approach reiterated
in Tristin-Donoso v. Panama.2 06
4. The Right to Access Information
The right to access information is fundamental to the ongoing development
of democracy. It is found in subsection one of Article 13 of the American
Convention, which provides that the right to freedom of expression includes
the freedom to seek out and receive information of all kinds.2 0 7
With respect to this issue, the Court has noted that "a society that is not
well informed is not a society that is truly free."2 08 Restrictions on access to
information held by public or private institutions (e.g., credit institutions)
must be "judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic societies
and institutions."2 09 This implies that the existence of an absolute prohibition
on access to information is incompatible with the American Convention.
Although exceptions and limited restrictions are possible (e.g., for national
security reasons), they should be narrowly interpreted and subject to judicial
review in all cases.
The Inter-American Court was the first international tribunal to recognize the right to freedom of information as part of the right to freedom of
expression in the case of Claude Reyes v. Chile. In that case, Reyes requested
information from the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee regarding a
deforestation project that he alleged could be detrimental to the environment and sustainable development of Chile.2 10 The Chilean government
failed to provide some of the requested information and did not give a
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

68 (2 May 2008),
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177,
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-I 77_ing.pdf.
Us6n-Ramirez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 1 66 (20
Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_207_ing.
pdf.
Id. 11 56, 66, 69, 83, 87; Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
78 (2 May 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
No.177,
seriec_1 77_ing.pdf.
TristAn-Donoso v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 1 112 (27
Jan. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193_ing.
pdf.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 1 70.
Id. 42.
Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, 1 3 (19
Sept. 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 51 _ing.
doc.
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reason for withholding it.21' The Court held that the Chilean government's
failure to provide part of the requested information constituted a violation
of "the right to freedom of thought and expression embodied in Article 13
of the American Convention to the detriment [of the petitioner], and failed
to comply with the general obligation to respect and ensure the rights and
freedoms established in Article 1(1) thereof." 2 12 In 2005, Chile reformed its
Constitution in an effort to adapt its laws to the American Convention. The
Constitution now establishes "that the confidentiality or secrecy of information must be established by law, [which is] a provision that did not exist at
the time of the facts of this case." 2 13
Prior to the Court's decision, several other non-jurisdictional bodies
had built on the right to freedom of information. The Commission began
developing this right as a "means of guaranteeing the right to protection
against information that is abusive, inaccurate, or prejudicial to individuals." 214 In continuing with this process, the Commission also established a
right to "access to public and private databases for the purpose, as necessary, of updating, correcting, removing, or reserving information about the
individual concerned. This action, known as habeas data, was introduced as
a modality of the 'amparo'process for the protection of personal privacy."215
The Commission expanded on this interpretation in its Report on Terrorism and Human Rights. In that report, the Commission established that
"access to information held by the State is a fundamental right of individuals
and States have the obligation to guarantee it." 216

211.

212.
213.
214.

Id. 3.
Id.
103.
Id.
100.
1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 182, ch. II, § B(3); 2001 Annual
26, available at
Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, ch. III,

http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=570&ID=1
215.

Report of the Special Rapporteur].
2001 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 214, ch. III,

[hereinafter 2001

26; accord 1999 Report

of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 182, ch. II, § B(3). In addition, the action of habeas
data imposes certain obligations for entities that process information: the obligation to
use the data for specific, explicitly stated objectives, and the obligation to guarantee
the security of the data against accidental, unauthorized access or manipulation. In
cases where entities of the state or the private sector obtain data improperly and/or
illegally, the petitioner must have access to that information, even when classified, so
that individuals have control over data that affects them. The action of habeas data as a
mechanism for ensuring the accountability of security and intelligence agencies within
this context provides a means to verify that personal data has been gathered legally.
The action of habeas data entitles the injured party, or his family members, to ascertain
the purpose for which the data was collected and, if collected illegally, to determine
whether the responsible parties are punishable. Public disclosure of illegal practices in
the collection of personal data can have the effect of preventing such practices by these
agencies in the future.
216.

Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OAS/

Ser..L.N/ll.116, doc. 5, rev. 1,

281 (2002).
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The Commission developed the principle of full disclosure on the rule
regarding access to information, which creates a legal presumption in favor of publicizing state-held information and imposes three conditions on
restrictions to the principle: legality, proportionality, and legitimacy. It also
asserted a need for judicial recourse for the review of a rejection to an
information request.217
In analyzing another aspect of the right to information, the Office of
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression held in its 2003 Annual
Report that "[t]he right of access to information is also a component of the
right to know the truth." 2 18 The Report further noted:
[T]he right to know the truth is a collective right that ensures society access to
information that is essential for the workings of democratic systems[. li]t is also
a private right for relatives of the [human rights] victims, which affords a form
of compensation, in particular, in cases where amnesty laws are adopted....
Access to state-held information is similarly necessary to prevent future abuses
by government officials and also to ensure that effective remedies against such

abuses are guaranteed. 2 19
5. Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of expression and thought in Article 13, the
American Convention provides for a right of correction and reply in Article
14.220 In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, the Court asserted that these articles
are inescapably related: "in regulating the application of the right of reply
or correction, the states parties must respect the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 13. They may not, however, interpret the right of
freedom of expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply proclaimed
by Article 14(1)."1221
The Court added that the right to reply guarantees respect for freedom
of expression in both its individual and shared dimensions. In the individual
dimension, the Court recognizes that this right "guarantees that a party injured by inaccurate or offensive statements has the opportunity to express
his [or her] views and thoughts about the injurious statements."222 The Court
further recognized that in the social dimension this right gives every person
217.

Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2003, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
ch. IV, 1 3, available athttp://www.cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=1 39&IID=1
[hereinafter 2003 Report of the Special Rapporteur. See also Claude-Reyes et al. v.
Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, 1 53 (19 Sept. 2006), available

218.

at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_151 ing.doc.
2003 Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 217, ch. IV, 1 14.

219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 14.
Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, supra note 38, 1 25.
Id. 5 (Separate Opinion of Judge Hector Gros Espiell).
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"the benefit of new information that contradicts or disagrees with the previous inaccurate or offensive statements." 22 3 In this respect, the right acts as
a balance of information which is needed for the public to form a true and

correct opinion. 224
While the Court has not had the opportunity to apply the law of correction to a contentious case, its Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 confirms certain
elements of this right. 225 First, the right of correction cannot legitimately
include value judgments. Second, since there are many ways of expressing
opinions, the correction or reply may not always be accomplished through
the same means (e.g., location, size, format).
6. Emergency Situations and Their Impact on Freedom of Expression
The regulation of emergency situations is of great importance to the protection of rights in general and to the protection of freedom of expression in
particular. Emergency situations arise when there is a threat against the life
of the nation. These situations permit restrictions on human rights, including
the right to freedom of expression.
In the Western Hemisphere, the emergency exception has been regularly
abused. Imaginary threats and real emergencies have become the arguments
of choice for justifying abuses and often mass and gross violations of human rights. 22 6 Attempting to curb those abuses, the American Convention
regulates emergencies extensively. Article 27 of this Convention sets forth
the conditions required to validly declare an emergency, lists non-derogable
rights, and the requirements that must be met to suspend other rights. 227
223.
224.
225.

226.

227.

Id.
Id.
Id.

See generally Claudio Grossman, Situaciones de Emergencia en el Hemisferio Occidental:
CONSTITUCIONAL
Propuestas para Fortalecer la Protecci6n de Derechos Humanos, in DERECHO
COMPARADO MxiCo-ESTADOS UNIDOS 175 (James Frank Smith ed., Universidad Nacional
Aut6noma de M~xico, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas 1990).
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27. Article 27 provides as follows:
1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of
a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to
the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do
not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article
3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment),
Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post FactoLaws), Article 12 (Freedom
of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article
19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in
Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform the other States
Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, of the provisions
the application of which it has suspended, the reasons that gave rise to the suspension, and the
date set for the termination of such suspension.
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The conditions are strict (a real or imminent threat to the life of a nation)
and must satisfy very high standards, namely that the state must show that
the normal powerful means at its disposal are insufficient to address events
that affect the continuation of civilized life.2 28
The requirements prescribed by the American Convention for the timely
suspension of rights-including freedom of expression-are: 1) necessity
(there must be absolutely no other possible alternatives in the case at hand);
2) timeliness (the suspension of rights is valid strictly for the time required);
3) proportionality (measures adopted cannot be an excessive reaction on the
part of the authorities in light of the existing emergency); 4) compatibility
(with other duties imposed by international law); 5) non-discrimination;
and 6) compliance with the law by the authorities (since the temporary
suspension of rights supposes actions by authorities consistent with the law
declared for reasons of general interest and for the purpose for which they

were established).22 9
7. The Link Between Freedom of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commission have established that there is an inherent link between freedom of expression and democracy. 23 0 As stated early
on in this article, in Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed that
"[flreedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence
of a democratic society rests," 231 and that this freedom is essential for the
development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies, and those who wish to influence the public. 23 2
The Commission explained its position with respect to this point in its
complaint before the Court in the Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case. It
asserted that Article 13 reflects a broad interpretation of freedom of expression and personal autonomy, the object of which is to protect and strengthen
access to information, ideas, and expressions of all types, in order to fortify
the democratic process. 23 3 Respect for these freedoms is not limited to al228.

229.
230.

231.
232.
233.

Id. See also Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina, Case 11.012, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 22/94, OEA/Ser.L.N./II.88 doc. 9, rev.1, 1 175 (1995), available at http://cidh.
org/annualrep/94eng/Argentinal 1012.htm; American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27;
Claudio Grossman, El Rgimen Hemisf~rico Sobre Situaciones de Emergencia, SERVICIO
DE DERECHOSHUMANOS 155 (1993).
DELINSTITUTOINTERAMERICANO
EDITORIAL
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27.
1999 Reportof the Special Rapporteur, supra note 182,Vol. III, Annex 5 (1999), available
at http://www.summit-americas.org/human%20rights/freedom-expression-1 999.htm. The
Declaration of Chapultepec, drafted by the Inter-American Press Society and adhered
to by several member countries, affirms that the battle for freedom of expression and of
the press, by whatever means, is an essential cause of democracy and of civilization in
the hemisphere.
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 1, 70.
Id
Ivcher-Bronstein Complaint, supra note 105, at 27.
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lowing the circulation of "acceptable" opinions and ideas.2 3 4 Furthermore,
in Canese v. Paraguay, the Commission stated:
The right to freedom of expression is precisely the right of the individual and of
the whole community to take part in active, concrete, and challenging debates
on all aspects of the normal, harmonious functioning of the society. These debates can often be critical of and even offensive to those who exercise public
positions or who are involved in formulating public policy.235
As stated by the Special Rapporteur, when debate is restricted, the
development of democracy is interrupted because the free debate of ideas
and opinion among citizens is impeded.2 3 6
The link between freedom of expression and democracy has been part
of a development process within the context of the OAS. Currently, only
democratic states may become members of that Organization. An important
milestone in this process was reached when OAS Resolution 1080 was adopted in Santiago, Chile in 1991.237 It allows OAS political organs to take
active measures, including diplomatic initiatives, when the constitutional
23 8
process of a country breaks down.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter broadens the scope of situations that would warrant OAS actions.23 9 The Charter specifically mentions
respect for freedom of expression. It was built on the jurisprudence cited
above and determined that democracy provides the theoretical and practical ground to guarantee freedom of information, as a necessary structure to
240
secure compliance with human rights.
234.
235.

Id.
Canese v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.111, 72 (31 Aug. 2004),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec- 11 ing.doc.

236.
237.

1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 4.
Resolution 1080 (XXI-0/91), Representative Democracy, OAS Fifth Plenary Session (5

238.
239.
240.

June 1991), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm.
Id.; Democratic Charter, supra note 47, art. 20.
See generally Democratic Charter, supra note 47.
Id. art. 4. Consolidation and expansion of democracies in the region will result, if we
consider comparative experiences, in the further development of the theoretical basis
of the right to freedom of expression. There are several key theories that demonstrate
the importance of freedom of expression in a democracy. Among these theorists are US
Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Vincent Blasi.
It is to be expected that further regional theoretical development will evolve throughout
the hemisphere as the interpretation of this important right expands. Oliver Wendell
Holmes' "Marketplace of Ideas" theory was adopted in the dissent of a US Supreme
Court case, Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919). In that case, the US Supreme
Court upheld a sentence convicting defendants of conspiring to "incite, provoke, and
encourage resistance to the United States in [World War II." Justice Holmes, in his dissent, expounded his theory on the importance of expressing oneself. This theory is that
free speech works best when subjected to the pressures and tests of the marketplace.
The exception would be if the expressed opinions and exhortations "so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country." Id. at 630.
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III. CONCLUSION

The interpretations of the American Convention by the Court and the Commission have developed a normative framework designed to protect freedom
of expression in the Inter-American system. Achieving full protection of the
right to freedom of expression in the Americas requires that states fully comply
with existing regional norms, as well as incorporating them into domestic
law. To meet these obligations, the following measures are essential.
First, contempt laws should be abolished, and moreover, defamation
should result only in civil liability. Although the Inter-American Court has kept
a residual possibility for criminal sanctions, the imposition of such sanctions
is subject to a stringent test; and in no case brought to its attention has the
Court found that the test has been satisfied.24 1 The free interchange of ideas
is essential for democratic society, and the possibility of criminal sanctions
in matters of public interest has a chilling effect. Furthermore, defending the
honor of individuals who act in the public domain through civil sanctions
only is preferable, due to the stifling effect that the criminalization of speech
has on debate. Because of the tenuous line that exists between private and
public matters, there are also advantages to decriminalizing speech in all
Alexander Meiklejohn argued that free speech is essential for self-government. This
theory held that people should be free to express their opinions without any fear of a
restriction on their speech and that nations should reject libel actions so that all mediums
may criticize the government and government officials. Meiklejohn viewed the United
States Supreme Court case, New York Times v.Sullivan, as "an occasion for dancing in
the streets." Quoting Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUPREMECT. REV. 191, 221 (1954). In Sullivan,

241.

the US Supreme Court held that a public official could not bring a libel action against
critics of his or her official conduct. According to the Court, "whatever is added to the
field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." The Verbitsky case is an example of
the government's use of a contempt law to deter public debate of government officials
in the Inter-American system. This case, ultimately resolved in friendly settlements, led
to Argentina's revocation of its libel laws and a reversal of Verbitsky's contempt charge.
In 1977, Vincent Blasi expounded his theory that "free speech, a free press, and
free assembly" can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials. The InterAmerican Court,held that access to public information permits the public to "question,
investigate, and consider whether public functions are being performed adequately." See
86 (19
Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 151,
Sept. 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_151 ing.
doc. In this sense, the Court was adopting Blasi's theory that the right to freedom of
expression may be used as a "checking power" on the state.
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.1 77, 78 (2 May 2008),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 77 ing.pdf; Rios et
al. v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 194, 1 37 (28 Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_194-ing.pdf; TristinDonoso v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 112 (27 Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-1 93-ing.pdf. See also
Valle-Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, 11
192-197 (27 Nov. 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec-1 92_ing.pdf.
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slander and libel laws. Again, the honor of individuals could be defended
through civil liability. While no jurisprudence has been developed by the
Inter-American Court in this matter, the language of Article 13 requires proportionate sanctions and provides a basis for an interpretation that excludes
the application of criminal law.
In the concurring opinion of Kimel, Judge Sergio Garcfa-Ramfrez elaborated on his earlier opinion in Herrera-Ulloa and advocated a complete departure from criminal sanctions to civil proceedings. 24 2 He regards the steps
taken by the majority in the Kimel judgment to limit criminal sanctions as
insufficient and urged that the same results can be achieved through the civil
courts without the disadvantages that criminal court proceedings carry.243
Second, subsequent civil liability should also be strictly regulated because it chills freedom of expression. The Court's reasoning in the Kimel
case has provided a framework for analysis that must be strictly applied.2 4 4
As outlined in the "Subsequent Liability" section above, Article 13(2) of the
American Convention expressly requires that the restrictions and scope of
liability for abuse be determined by law. Broad interpretations of permissible
grounds for subsequent liability or disproportionate civil responsibilities
negatively impact the free expression of ideas and could have the same
impact of prior censorship.
Third, defense of honor should be limited to natural persons and not
extended to institutions. Accordingly, it should exclude situations where
expression of an opinion is charged as "slander against the National Armed
Forces," as in Us6n-Ramirez. 2 45 Legitimate national security concerns in
the framework of a democratic society could be taken into account for the
purposes of subsequent of liability, but there is no place in the Convention
to resort to honor concepts designed to protect individuals. 24 6
Fourth, freedom of expression requires pluralism in the media and
rejection of public and private monopolies. To achieve this objective, antimonopolistic laws should be developed and strictly enforced. Moreover, the
Court has found that states have a positive obligation to "not only minimize
restrictions on the dissemination of information, but also extend equity rules,
to the greatest possible extent, to the participation in the public debate of
different types of information, fostering informative pluralism." 2 47 It is im-
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Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177, l1 19-26.
Id. 1 21, 26.
Id. 1 58.
38 (20
Us6n-Ramirez v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193,
Nov. 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_207-ing.
pdf.
See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(2)(b). See also American Convention,
supra note 2, art. 27.
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.177, 1 57.
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portant to give guidance to states, the media, and the public in general as
to the content of the Court's interpretation.
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression could play a crucial
role in this process. It is within her mandate to present studies and reports
to the states or the Commission that contribute to the full realization of
freedom of expression. These studies can become, if adopted by the Commission, valid interpretations of the American Convention.
In the conditions of the hemisphere, where authoritarianism is a recent
occurrence and we are witnessing new attempts at centralization of power,
the importance of a normative framework that secures pluralistic expression
cannot be exaggerated. The need to secure pluralistic expression should
focus on the addition of voices and not on the suppression of expression, a
danger that unfortunately is currently present. The importance of this matter
would require the identification of legitimate criteria to ensure pluralistic
expression by an authoritative organ like the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights.
Fifth, transparency should be encouraged in the functions of both the
government and private organizations. The adoption of domestic laws that
guarantee free access to information in the possession of government and
private organizations is fundamental to achieving the full protection of
freedom of expression.
Finally, the role of the Inter-American system continues to be crucial,
providing a venue to promote and protect the right of freedom of expression
when a state is unable or unwilling to apply its international obligation. That
role, however, needs to be expanded further.
The Office of the Special Rapporteur needs to be strengthened to ensure
it receives sufficient resources to function properly. The Office of the Rapporteur is currently mostly grant-funded, which makes long-term planning
a challenge. In addition, the Special Rapporteur should be able to perform
unannounced visits in loco to states-particularly in situations where the
lives of journalists are at stake.
Human rights training on the right to freedom of expression for civil
servants, judges, lawyers, and journalists is required to invoke and apply
international norms in the domestic realm. This training could play a preventative role to the extent that violations of the right of freedom of expression
are the result of lack of knowledge of its content.
The Inter-American system should strengthen its petition system on
the right to freedom of expression. This may be accomplished by ensuring
hearings and prompt decisions of the cases concerning this right, including provisional measures if irreparable harm is present. The system must
also denounce lack of compliance with the decisions of supervisory organs
by states that have violated the American Convention. At a minimum, the
political organs should place on the agenda decisions by the supervisory
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organs including violations of the right to freedom of expression. Specific
discussion of human rights violations mobilize public opinion and have
a potential for negative internal political repercussions for a government.
Public discussion also creates space for the adoption of regional measures
to protect and promote this freedom, e.g., suspension from participation in
the organization when this right has been violated, in accordance with the

Democratic Charter. 248
The impact of public discussion of violations and the political willingness to act in each case are debatable issues. However, victims perceive
the total absence of debate and action by the political organs of the OAS
concerning human rights offenses as the worst alternative. Governments
that violate human rights do what they can to silence the victims. A debate
preceded by the decision of an authoritative organ may not secure remedial
action or punishment of the wrongdoer. It may, however, carry the possibility of influencing national and international actors in the long process of
achieving human dignity.

248.

See Democratic Charter, supra note 47, art. 21.

